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Introduction
In the summer of 2010, the human rights record of Sri Lanka in the 
aftermath of its civil war remained dismal.1 In Canada, the Immigration 
and Refugee Board’s acceptance rates for refugee claims made by Tamils 
? eeing Sri Lanka was at approximately 84 percent.2 On 13 August 2010, 
a cargo ship, the MV Sun Sea (Sun Sea), arrived off the coast of British 
Columbia carrying 492 Tamil men, women, and children who were 
? eeing Sri Lanka. Their voyage took just over two months, under horrible 
conditions. One passenger had died at sea. Most, if not all, had paid tens 
of thousands of dollars to board the ship to take this dangerous voyage. All 
made claims for refugee protection on arrival.3  
This was the second ship in the space of a year to arrive in Canada 
with Tamil refugee claimants aboard. The MV Ocean Lady (Ocean Lady) 
had arrived in British Columbia ten months earlier, in October 2009. There 
1. See, e.g., Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2010—Sri Lanka” (28 May 
2010), online: Amnesty International <www.refworld.org/docid/4dce153c44.html> [perma.cc/2S99-
NRJN] (documenting the extensive human rights abuses in the country). 
2. CBSA, “Marine Migrants: Program Strategy for the Next Arrival,” online (pdf): <ccrweb.ca/
en/sun-sea-cbsa-strategy> [perma.cc/Y4UP-LV6C] (obtained by the Canadian Council for Refugees 
through Access to Information) [CBSA Arrivals memo].
3. For a comprehensive review of the MV Sun Sea’s arrival to Canada, see Canadian Council of 
Refugees, “Sun Sea: Five years later” (2015), online (pdf): Canadian Council of Refugees <http://
ccrweb.ca/en/sun-sea-? ve-years-later> [perma.cc/VT7A-GSF6].
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were 76 Tamil refugee claimants, 75 men and 1 child, from Sri Lanka 
aboard. They also all made claims for refugee protection upon arrival.4 
When the ???? ??? arrived, the Canadian government had already 
prepared its response.5 As the ship was escorted into the naval base in 
Esquimalt, the then-Minister of Public Safety, Vic Toews, held a press 
conference branding some of those inside the ship as members of terrorist 
and human smuggling groups and announcing that there would be an 
aggressive response to their arrival in Canada.6 This ? rst government press 
conference, held within hours of the boat docking, set the stage for the use 
of the image of the arrival of 492 refugee claimants on the ??????? as a 
pretext for a broad legislative and political campaign centred on refugees.7
At the time of the ship’s arrival, I had been practicing refugee law for 
approximately four years. I was working in Vancouver, where the vast 
majority of the claims were heard and acted as counsel for some of the 
claimants. In this paper, I draw heavily upon my own observations and 
experiences with how the political campaign and the publicly-stated goal 
of deterring future claimants from arriving by boats played out on the 
individual legal claims of the ??????? passengers. The experience left an 
indelible mark on me. These refugee claimants were uniformly subjected 
to a heightened level of scrutiny and opposition. While the hearing process 
at the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) generally remained the same, 
the intense level of involvement of the Canada Border Services Agency 
(CBSA) in uniformly opposing these claims was not usual. 
My focus is not on the tribunal and court decisions concerning the 
individual refugee, detention and/or inadmissibility cases of the ??????? 
4. For a review of the way ?????????? claimants were treated in the context of Canada’s historic 
treatment of marine arrivals, see Alexandera Mann, “Refugees Who Arrive by Boat and Canada’s 
Commitment to the Refugee Convention: A Discursive Analysis” (2009) 26:2 Refuge 191.?
5. Unlike the ?????? ????, which the Canadian Government had only been monitoring for 
approximately 20 hours prior to its arrival in Canadian waters (see? ???? at 198), the Government 
was monitoring the ??????? for weeks and planning a detailed response. See Chad Skelton: “CBSA 
directive on Tamil migrants: Detain, detain, detain,” ????????????? (4 August 2011), online: <https://
vancouversun.com/news/staff-blogs/cbsa-directive-on-tamil-migrants-detain-detain-detain> [perma.
cc/37UC-XCKG]; and “Canada Monitors Suspicious Vessel; May be carrying migrants to B.C. Coast: 
Report,” ????????????? (16 July 2010), (ProQuest—Canadian Newsstand); “RCMP seize vessel on 
human smuggling tip; ‘Security partners’ raise alert to ship found off B.C. coast,” ???? ????????????? 
(18 October 2009), (ProQuest—Canadian Newsstand).
6. Petti Fong, “Canadian of? cials board Tamil ship,” ???????? ???? (13 August 2010), online: 
<www.thestar.com/news/canada/2010/08/13/canadian_of? cials_board_tamil_ship.html> [perma.
cc/2TSK-FX57].
7. As Professor Jennifer Bond has written, “the government clearly viewed its ‘tough on 
smuggling’ messaging as politically advantageous and thus worthy of loud publication.” Jennifer 
Bond, “Failure to Report: The Manifestly Unconstitutional Nature of the Human Smugglers Act” 
(2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 377 at 407-408.
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passengers. Rather, I concentrate on CBSA’s conduct in relation to these 
492 legal claims. There was a coordinated and unwavering approach taken 
with respect to the legal claims of the Sun Sea passengers. A signi? cant 
amount of government resources and funds were invested in opposing 
these cases.8 Tactics included: lengthier investigations of claimants, a 
high number of CBSA Ministerial interventions in the refugee hearings, 
claimants were kept in detention for lengthier periods, and there was a 
greater number of challenges in Federal Court to try to quash determinations 
made in favour of the claimants. 
It is not unusual for refugee claims to be the subject of heated political 
contention. Canada’s approach to refugees has been a political issue in 
the last two Federal general elections. The Sun Sea claimants featured 
prominently in the 2011 election where a platform was built on a federal 
party’s commitment to preventing ‘bogus’ claimants from abusing the 
asylum system.9 
The arrival of the Ocean Lady and the Sun Sea also served as a pretext 
for legislative reform10 and a change in Canada’s strategy abroad to try to 
deter overseas asylum seekers from using boats to make the journey to 
8. By February 2011, CBSA estimates put the cost of detention of the Sun Sea claimants at 
approximately $18 million. See Tim Naumetz, “Mass detention of 300 Tamil migrants cost $18 
million says Canada Border Services Agency,” The Hill Times (14 February 2011), online: < www.
hilltimes.com/2011/02/14/mass-detention-of-300-tamil-migrants-cost-18-million-says-canada-
border-services-agency/15475> [perma.cc/E5X3-SF4P]. This amount did not include government 
costs incurred through lengthier investigations, litigating the claimants’ continued detention, arguing 
against their refugee claims, and seeking judicial reviews and stay orders of favourable determinations. 
9. The image of the Sun Sea was on television screens again during the 2011 election; the ship’s 
image was in the background of an English-language Conservative Party of Canada commercial, with a 
voiceover stating, “Stephen Harper has a plan to crack down on human smugglers and bogus claimants 
who jump the queue.” A French-language ad stated that “Clandestine immigrants are abusing our 
hospitality and generosity” and criticizing the opposition parties for being “against the temporary 
detention of clandestine immigrants” before concluding that “happily, we have Stephen Harper’s 
Conservatives.” See Conservative Party of Canada “Illegal Immigration Ad—Conservative Party 
of Canada—2011 Election Campaign” (29 March 2011) at 00h:00m:25s, online (video): YouTube 
<https://youtu.be/bcptS3RSvyY?t=25> [perma.cc/RE2D-3WL5] (French) https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=NdY0Wci2c0Y (English).
10. CTV News Staff, “Bill targets human smugglers, ‘irregular migrants,’” CTV News (21 October 
2010), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/bill-targets-human-smugglers-irregular-migrants-1.565638> 
[perma.cc/G5DE-MS8W]. Approximately three months after the boat’s arrival, Jason Kenney, the 
Minister of Immigration at the time, and Vic Toews, returned to the coast to hold a press conference 
in front of the Ocean Lady, announcing new legislation, the Preventing Human Smugglers from 
Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act. This bill included measures that punished asylum seekers 
for the manner in which they came to Canada, including, if designated by the Minister, mandatory 
detention for one year. See Bill C-49, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 
the Balanced Refugee Reform Act and the Marine Transportation Security Act, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, 
2010 (? rst reading 21 October 2010).
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Canada in the ? rst place.11 In the past two years, the increase in refugee 
claimants entering Canada from the United States at irregular border 
crossings has also become a more prominent political issue.12 Based on the 
past ten years, it is reasonable to assume that the politicization of refugee 
? ows will continue.13 The ongoing politicization can provide incentive 
for governments of all political stripes to bend the process of refugee 
determination to their ends, and for CBSA to attempt to meet what it 
considers to be the political imperatives emanating from the government, 
even when they are not under explicit direction to do so. In light of this, 
examining CBSA’s conduct in the context of a series of claims that were 
highly politicized is useful in considering whether there are the appropriate 
checks to ensure fairness.  
I will argue that the ???? ??? provides a case study that highlights 
the dearth of accountability checks on CBSA’s conduct. This conduct has 
been challenging to raise within judicial or adjudicative processes. This 
is because the judicial scrutiny focuses on reviewing a speci? c tribunal’s 
decision in an individual’s refugee, detention or admissibility case, and not 
usually systemic issues. It is my position that the CBSA’s approach to the 
??????? claims demonstrates inherent systemic and structural problems 
in CBSA’s design. These, in turn, allowed the government’s political 
goals to unduly infect the handling of individual claims for protection. I 
suggest that signi? cant rule of law concerns, in particular concerns about 
arbitrariness, arise from the way the ????????legal claims were approached 
and conducted by the CBSA. This supports the conclusion that structural 
reforms are required to provide accountability for CBSA’s law enforcement 
11. For example, soon after the boat’s arrival, a former CSIS chief headed to Asia to discuss further 
co-operation between Canada and intelligence and police forces abroad with the goal of deterring 
future boats from making the journey to Canada. See Campbell Clark, “Former CSIS Chief Tasked 
with Cracking Down on Migrant Smuggling,” ?????????????? (9 September 2010), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/former-csis-chief-tasked-with-cracking-down-
on-migrant-smuggling/article1369343/> [perma.cc/W9EK-J67L]; Colin Freeze, “Tamil arrests send 
warning to people smugglers, Ottawa says,” ???????????????????(29 October 2010, updated 2 May 
2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/tamil-arrests-send-warning-to-people-
smugglers-ottawa-says/article1215834/> [perma.cc/3BXM-2G9Z]; Stewart Bell, “On the smugglers’ 
trail: The unlucky ones,” ????????? ????? (29 March 2011), online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/
on-the-smugglers-trail-the-unlucky-ones> [perma.cc/A6D8-D3YA]. 
12. See, for example, the Conservative Party of Canada website which, at time of writing, highlights 
this “Illegal Border Crossers” as a political issue, and has a pledge page calling on the government to 
“? x this mess” which it claims will cost $1.1 billion. Conservative Party of Canada, “Illegal Border 
Crossers” (accessed on 3 March 2019), online: <www.conservative.ca/cpc/illegal-border-crossers/> 
[perma.cc/HBE5-7RPE].
13. For further discussion, see the description of the political rhetoric surrounding refugee reforms 
described in Emily Bates, Jennifer Bond & David Wiseman, “Troubling Signs: Mapping Access to 
Justice in Canada’s Refugee System Reform” (2016) 47:1 Ottawa L Rev 1 at 29; Bond, ??????note 8.
???? ?????????????????????????
and refugee processing functions, and to ensure the accountability and 
independence of hearing of? cers who represent the government’s interest 
before the IRB. 
I propose two reforms. First, the creation of an independent 
accountability mechanism to enable the review of CBSA law enforcement 
conduct and exercises of discretion. Second, the creation of a structural 
separation between the CBSA of? cers who are assigned to act as 
representatives of the Crown at IRB hearings, and those of? cers who 
perform refugee intake, investigative, and enforcement functions.
Below I ? rst describe the roles which CBSA play in the refugee 
determination process. I then turn to the Sun Sea cases and present 
evidence concerning the unusual instructions that CBSA of? cers received, 
and how they were encouraged to treat all the claims, before providing 
examples of how those instructions affected individual claimants, from 
detention decisions to arguments that were pursued at the hearing and 
judicial review stages. This evidence is then drawn upon to illustrate 
rule of law implications, before I canvass the efforts that were made to 
challenge the rule of law issues and why it is structurally dif? cult to bring 
such challenges. I conclude with my proposals for reforms to support 
accountability.
I. Canada Border Services Agency: Roles in the refugee determination 
process 
The CBSA is a relatively young agency. It was formed in 2003 by an Order 
in Council to amalgamate responsibilities which to that point had been 
spread across a number of different agencies, including Canada Customs, 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency. CBSA’s enabling statute describes its mandate as “providing 
integrated border services that support national security and public safety 
priorities and facilitate the free ? ow of persons and goods…”14 
While CBSA is a large, national border police force, it is unique 
among Canada’s law enforcement agencies in that it lacks any kind of 
independent accountability mechanism. 15 This is despite the wide range of 
powers possessed by the agency. These powers include: preventing entry 
to Canada; detaining people; conducting inland enforcement including 
carrying out raids and arrests; enforcing customs laws; and (as described 
14. Canada Border Services Agency Act, SC 2005, c 38.
15. Laura Track & Josh Paterson, “Oversight at the Border: A Model for Independent Accountability 
at the Canada Border Services Agency” (June 2017), online (pdf): British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association <qweri.lexum.com/w/canlii/2017CanLIIDocs199.pdf> [perma.cc/6EJ5-EUAL] at 13 
[BCCLA].
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further below) conducting many aspects of the refugee intake process.16
Instead, CBSA has an internal process for dealing with complaints, the 
Recourse Directorate, which reports directly and only to the president 
of CBSA. This internal process has been criticized for its lack of 
independence, its limited scope (as it is complaint driven), its inability to 
conduct systemic reviews, and its lack of transparency.17
In the refugee context, CBSA is involved from initial intake through 
to the removal of failed refugee claimants. In broad terms, there are four 
areas where CBSA of? cers primarily interact with refugee claimants: initial 
intake, admissibility proceedings, refugee determination, and removal. 
Within these broad categories, CBSA of? cers hold vast and varied powers 
that include enforcement and investigation, and acting as representatives 
of the Crown at IRB hearings. All of these roles are elaborated upon below.
When a person makes a refugee claim upon arrival at a port of entry 
(airport, marine, or land), a CBSA enforcement of? cer will likely conduct 
the ? rst examination to determine whether they meet the criteria for 
admissibility, and whether they are eligible to make a claim for asylum.18 In 
conducting this examination, the claimant is obligated to answer questions 
truthfully.19 In this initial screening, the CBSA will conduct a preliminary 
security screening. This will involve activities including seizing identity 
documents, taking ? ngerprints, and running checks through shared 
databases with a number of countries. If eligible, a refugee claim will be 
referred to the IRB.20 In my experience, for most cases, barring security 
and identity issues, this initial processing, even for port of entry cases,21
does not normally take longer than a few hours. 
16. Ibid at 11-13.
17. Track, supra note 16 at 27-29.
18. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, ss 15-16, 100-101 (examination process for determining 
eligibility and the grounds of ineligibility) [IRPA].
19. Ibid s 16.
20. Ibid s 100.
21. Eligibility screening of refugee claims initiated inland tend to be conducted by Immigration 
Refugee and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) of? cers. In a recent independent review of the IRB conducted 
by Neil Yeates, he noted that stakeholders expressed concern that “the port of entry examination by 
CBSA is more exhaustive than the intake interview of IRCC, giving rise to the concern that one 
process is too detailed and invasive for vulnerable persons presenting claims at the port and the other 
less rigorous and value-added.”.Neil Yates, “Report of the Independent Review of the Immigration 
and Refugee Board: A Systems Management Approach to Asylum” (10 April 2018) at 61, online 
(pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/irb-report-en.pdf> [perma.
cc/ESH6-6WHM].
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A CBSA of? cer can also decide if there is a basis to detain the claimant.22
The basis for detaining a foreign national on immigration grounds is limited 
to concerns relating to being a ? ight risk or to establishing identity, being 
a danger to the public, and/or being the subject of a security or criminality 
investigation.23 If the of? cer believes that there are grounds to detain, this 
is set out in a report, which is passed on to a CBSA hearing of? cer. The 
hearing of? cer is  responsible for representing the Minister of Public Safety 
and Emergency Preparedness at any detention review hearings before the 
Immigration Division at the IRB.24 The CBSA hearing of? cer may decide 
to release the claimant on identi? ed conditions prior to the ? rst detention 
review,25 or may choose to refer the case to the Immigration Division 
and present arguments before the tribunal that release should only be on 
conditions, or for continued detention.
In the refugee determination process, CBSA of? cers are noti? ed that 
a refugee hearing will be held, and have access to the initiating refugee 
documents in all ? les.26 The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness can intervene in a number of ways at a refugee hearing: ? ling 
documentary evidence, being present at the hearing and conducting an oral 
examination of the claimant, and/or making written or oral submissions to 
the tribunal about any or all aspects of the claim. Prior to the creation 
of CBSA, when there was an enforcement branch of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal described Minister’s 
interventions as “primarily oriented towards detecting and opposing 
claims that the Minister or her of? cials believe should not allowed.”27
In my experience, this is an apt description for CBSA hearing of? cers’ 
orientation in refugee interventions as well. Generally, the CBSA will only 
22. The decision to detain a foreign national can happen at any time throughout their time in Canada. 
In my experience as duty counsel, we tend to see claimants being detained either at the front end of 
their process because of identity or security concerns, or at the back end if they are failed claimants, 
when they are facing removal from Canada and there are ? ight risk allegations.
23. For grounds of detention see IRPA, supra note 19 s 58; Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 244.
24. IRPA, supra note 19 s 57. Detention review hearings must occur 48 hours after a person is taken 
into detention “or without delay afterward.” Subsequent reviews occur at least once in seven days 
following the initial review and every 30 days thereafter. 
25. Ibid s 56.
26. Ibid s 100(4), 170(d). Part of the initiating package of documents includes the Basis of Claim 
form that sets out the claimant’s reason for seeking protection. 
27. Ahumada v Canada (MCI), 2001 FCA 97 at para 33. The Federal Court of Appeal characterized 
an of? cer from the enforcement branch of CIC (a role that was later taken on by CBSA hearing 
of? cers) as having an “enforcement perspective” at para 54. 
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intervene where it expects to oppose some aspect of the claimant’s case.28
While a CBSA hearing of? cer may decide to withdraw the intervention 
when further information is provided, or not provide submissions opposing 
the claim after hearing from the claimant at the hearing, the rationale for 
? ling an intervention is to be in a position to oppose some aspect of the 
claim if necessary. The CBSA can also appeal a positive refugee decision 
to the Refugee Appeal Division even if they have not intervened at the 
? rst hearing.29 At the time of the Sun Sea’s arrival, the Refugee Appeal 
Division had not yet been implemented and therefore none of the claimants’ 
cases were appealed there. Instead, the Minister applied for leave to have 
a number of positive refugee determinations judicially reviewed by the 
Federal Court. 
Where a CBSA of? cer is concerned that a claimant may be inadmissible 
on security or criminality grounds, they may decide to write a report setting 
out the allegations which is sent to a Minister’s Delegate for review. If 
a Minister’s Delegate at CBSA then refers the inadmissibility report to 
the IRB, an admissibility hearing will be scheduled at the Immigration 
Division.30 A CBSA hearing of? cer will represent CBSA at that hearing. 
They will have the onus to demonstrate that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person concerned is inadmissible.31 As soon 
as an inadmissibility proceeding is initiated at the IRB, IRPA requires an 
automatic suspension of the refugee hearing at the Refugee Protection 
Division.32 
CBSA also handles the removal arrangements for foreign nationals, 
including failed refugee claimants. If a person has an enforceable removal 
order, it is a CBSA of? cer’s job to make arrangements to remove the 
individual from Canada as soon as possible.33 Requests to defer a removal 
are made to and tend to be decided by CBSA enforcement of? cers. 
As the agency charged with processing refugee claimants upon arrival, 
determining whether claimants are eligible to make refugee claims, 
assessing whether a claimant might be inadmissible, and intervening in 
28. CBSA’s guidelines for Ministerial Interventions make clear that the priority for interventions are 
cases involving security and criminality exclusions, cases of possibly large-scale misrepresentation 
and fraud, and certain other exclusions or credibility issues. See Immigration Refugees and Citizenship 
Canada, ENF 24: Ministerial Interventions (2016) at 12-13, online (pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/
dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/enf/enf24-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/R8F3-PMNR] 
[ENF 24].
29. IRPA, supra note 19 s 110(1).
30. Ibid ss 44(1)-(2).
31. Ibid s 33.
32. Ibid s 103(a).
33. Ibid s 48(2).
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refugee hearings on behalf of the government, CBSA was deeply involved 
as the lead government agency in every aspect of the Sun Sea cases.
II. Pre-arrival: A coordinated and aggressive approach
We now know that before the Sun Sea arrived in Canada, the CBSA was 
planning its approach, not only in terms of public messaging, but also 
the approach the agency should take with respect to the handling of the 
individual legal claims of the Sun Sea passengers. An undated memo 
was written by CBSA’s Director General of Post-Border Programs to the 
Vice President of the CBSA setting out a “program strategy” to deal with 
its eminent arrival. The memo was obtained approximately three years 
after the ship arrived through an access to information request ? led by 
the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR).34 At the time the memo was 
obtained, there was already a general sense among refugee lawyers who 
had been working on these ? les that the CBSA had a coordinated approach 
that was far more aggressive than in other similar refugee cases. The memo 
con? rmed that such a strategy had been planned. 
The rationale underlying the proposed strategy was framed in this way 
in the memo: 
It appears that the CBSA’s approach for dealing with the last marine 
arrivals in October 2009 may have been less effective than it could have 
been. For the next arrivals, the CBSA is proposing a more aggressive 
approach to create a deterrent for future arrivals.35 
The “more aggressive approach” focused on how the individual legal claims 
of the passengers on the Sun Sea would be treated through investigation 
and litigation processes. The proposal identi? ed a strategy of extensive 
interrogations, lengthy detentions, aggressive attempts to build evidence 
to argue claimants were inadmissible, and aggressive interventions by the 
Minister at every refugee hearing:
a. ???????????????????????: There would be extensive interrogations 
in which the “CBSA will gather as much information and evidence 
as possible to build cases that demonstrate that the marine people 
smuggling is serious and poses a signi? cant threat to the health 
and safety of those in Canada.” 
b. ??????????????????????????: There was a plan to detain claimants 
as long as was possible, with recognition that this plan may be 
34. CBSA Arrivals memo, supra note 3; Tobi Cohen, “Internal memo details tough treatment of 
would be refugees,” Vancouver Sun (27 September 2013), online: <o.canada.com/news/internal-
memo-details-tough-treatment-of-would-be-refugees> [perma.cc/MJX9-4JZW].
35. CBSA Arrivals memo, supra note 3 at 2. 
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limited where there were no legal grounds to detain: “Detention 
is an effective tool against those who circumvent immigration 
processes. The CBSA will take maximum advantage of this tool 
recognizing that there may be limitations if no legal grounds to 
detain exist.” 
c. Aggressive in building evidence alleging inadmissibility: Where 
there was a possibility that a claimant might be inadmissible on 
some ground, the CBSA would be aggressive in building evidence 
to argue that a claimant was inadmissible: “The IRB will hold 
inadmissibility hearings on cases where the examination reveals 
additional, more serious, inadmissibility grounds. In these cases, 
the CBSA will be aggressive in building evidence arguing for 
inadmissibility.”
d. Aggressive interventions in ??????refugee hearing: There was 
a pre-determined plan to intervene and argue in each refugee 
hearing that the person was not a refugee: “In terms of the 
approach for refugee determination hearings, they will be dealt 
with aggressively as well. The CBSA will advise the IRB that 
it intends to intervene in each case, however, the IRB’s current 
84 [percent] acceptance rate will be a challenge. Nonetheless, 
the CBSA plans to build standard evidence packages that would 
be used for each case to show why the person is not a refugee. 
The evidence package would also be useful tools for detention 
reviews.”
From the outset, the direction provided from CBSA management was that 
an “aggressive approach” should be used in relation to individual claims 
in order “to create a deterrent for future arrivals.” While the concept of 
deterrence is an integral part of the criminal justice system and principles 
of sentencing,36 its place here, in deciding how the CBSA should approach 
an individual’s refugee claim, is problematic. 
The manner in which a claimant travels is not relevant to determining 
the merits of their refugee claims, but here it was nonetheless used as 
a determining factor in how their cases were approached by the CBSA. 
There is a recognition in refugee law that asylum claimants may have to 
use irregular means to arrive in a country where they can seek asylum, 
and that ? eeing for one’s safety may necessitate this. As a result, both 
international law and domestic law prohibit penalizing refugee claimants 
36. Clayton Ruby et al, ??????????, 9th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2017) at 10 (§1.27). 
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for the manner in which they have entered Canada.37 However, the CBSA 
decided to treat these particular claimants in a more aggressive fashion for 
the very purpose of deterring other claimants from travelling to Canada in 
the same manner. In effect, the claimants were explicitly penalized for the 
manner in which they travelled, violating the spirit of a basic tenet of the 
Refugee Convention. 
Three elements in the CBSA’s memo stand out. First, instead of 
determining the right approach for each claim based on the claimant’s 
circumstances, a uniform strategy was adopted before the ? rst claim was 
even assessed—indeed, before the Sun Sea even arrived in Canadian 
waters. Regardless of the prima facie strength of an individual claim, 
whether a person was an unaccompanied minor, whether they had been 
detained by the Sri Lankan authorities, or whether they had evidence they 
were wanted by the authorities, the approach to each refugee claim would 
be the same—it would be opposed. Second, the word “aggressive” is 
used multiple times to describe the strategy to be used. Again, no matter 
the circumstances of an individual’s case, the CBSA had pre-determined 
it would use strong oppositional tactics. Third, there was no separation 
between how the CBSA would approach its investigative/law enforcement 
functions, and its “Crown counsel” functions at detention, refugee and 
admissibility hearings before the IRB. The strategy for CBSA of? cers 
would be uniform, with CBSA enforcement of? cers working in tandem 
with the CBSA hearing of? cers representing the Minister before the IRB. 
There was a pre-determined approach to extensively interrogate, build the 
evidence and then use “aggressive” arguments at the tribunal in each case. 
III. CBSA approach to the individual Sun Sea claims
The proposed investigation and litigation strategy was implemented when 
Sun Sea and its passengers arrived in Canada. In this section I set out 
some of the features of how these claims were handled. I draw upon on 
my own knowledge and experience as a refugee lawyer working on Sun 
Sea claims, extensive communications with fellow counsel, a review of 
caselaw, and observations arising from the general monitoring of refugee 
lawyers’ listserve communications.
37. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 art 31(1) (entered 
into force 22 April 1954, accession by Canada 4 June 1969): “The Contracting States shall not impose 
penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a 
territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in 
their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities 
and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”; IRPA, supra note 19 s 133 provides that 
where a person has claimed refugee protection, they cannot be charged with an offence relating to the 
manner in each they entered pending the resolution of their refugee claim. 
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All of the passengers made refugee claims upon arrival and were 
ordered detained.38 They were given alphanumeric codenames called 
“B numbers”—that is to say, each passenger was identi? ed in their IRB 
proceedings by a unique number such as “B001” or “B145,” instead of by 
their name. The Sun Sea claimants were extensively interrogated. Many of 
the claimants were detained for a number of months39 and were subjected 
to repeated and intensive interrogations throughout the course of their 
detention. For example, some claimants were falsely accused of lying and 
falsely told that there was other information on ? le about them that had 
been elicited by interrogating other passengers on the ship. CBSA also 
made phone calls to family members who were living abroad to question 
them about some of the claims. 
The nature of these interrogations and inquiries was not typical. For 
example, when the ship ? rst arrived, I was one of the lawyers who represented 
the unaccompanied minors. I had previously represented unaccompanied 
minors who were making refugee claims. The unaccompanied children 
from the Sun Sea were subjected to lengthy examinations not only relating 
to the conditions on the ship, and the manner in which they made their way 
to Canada, but also about their family members in Sri Lanka and the details 
of their refugee claim. In my experience, other child refugee claimants 
were not subjected to similarly lengthy or involved interrogations.  
As had been set out in the memo prior to arrival, CBSA hearing 
of? cers were “aggressive” in arguing for continued detention. Soon after 
arrival, a memo from CBSA National Headquarters was delivered which 
outlined strategies for arguing for continued detention.40 The memo 
noted that of? cers should be assured that they had the support of senior 
management of CBSA and partner agencies in making arguments for 
continued detention.
Where claimants did not have identity documents, the ? rst step for 
CBSA hearing of? cers was to argue that identity was not established. This 
was not unusual in and of itself; in my experience, it is not uncommon 
for refugee claimants to be held in detention when they have no identity 
38. IRPA, supra note 19 s 55(3)(a) provides that a foreign national can be detained upon entry into 
Canada if an of? cer ”considers it necessary for the examination to be completed.” The unaccompanied 
minors, ranging in age from 13 to 16 were quickly released into the care of the child welfare authorities, 
the BC Ministry of Children and Family Development. 
39. Approximately six months after arrival, 107 Sun Sea claimants remained in detention. See 
Naumetz, supra note 9.
40. Memorandum from CBSA (accessed 13 May 2019), NHQ Direction to the Paci? c Region 
concerning the detention reviews in the case of the Sun Sea migrants, online: <www.scribd.com/
embeds/61628703/content?start_page=1&view_mode=list&access_key=key-gqtrmdz4g8tfai3zpe9> 
[perma.cc/LYW6-P3P4] [CBSA Detention Memo].
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documents. The memo went on to say that where the identity documents 
were produced, hearing of? cers would then argue that the documents 
may be fraudulent. There was a suggestion in the memo that fraudulent 
documents may have been used because it was a smuggling operation. 
Typical identity veri? cation procedures were treated as insuf? cient in some 
of the cases. Unlike cases involving other refugee claimants, there were 
additional steps taken above and beyond the ordinary identify veri? cation 
checks. In these cases, identity documents were being sent to a Migration 
Integrity Of? ce (MIO) in Sri Lanka, a process that had no set timeline.41
One Member of the Immigration Division commented on the unusual 
approach taken on establishing identity in these cases: 
I have about 14 years of experience as an immigration adjudicator and I 
would say that in this case—in these cases—the Minister has raised the 
bar on what will satisfy him with respect to the identity of persons on 
the MV Sun Sea…the method of arrival—that is by ship—seems to have 
struck a nerve and led to the Minister requiring or setting this higher 
standard.42
As identi? ed by this Member at the Immigration Division, the Minister 
appeared to be requiring a higher standard to demonstrate identity, simply 
because of the manner in which the claimants travelled to Canada. There 
was not any correlation established between this method of travel and a 
heighted concern about identity, particularly after the claimants produced 
identity documents that were veri? ed through the standard procedures.
If there were no longer grounds to argue that identity was not 
established, the memo from CBSA National Headquarters instructed 
that “CBSA is to argue for continued detention on any other applicable 
ground.”43 In a number of the cases, CBSA argued that the claimant was 
a ? ight risk because they had an outstanding debt owed to smugglers. 
To respond to this argument, claimants had to produce proof that their 
families had paid the amount owing to smugglers overseas. In making 
these arguments, government representatives were essentially requiring 
claimants to pay criminal smuggling operators in order to satisfy the 
of? cers that there was no basis for continued detention.44 This pattern of 
conduct exempli? es the problem of “tunnel vision” that is discussed later 
41. See, e.g., Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v B232, 2011 FC 257 at para 38; Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) v B046, 2011 FC 877 at para 56 [B046].
42. B046, supra note 42 at para 40.
43. CBSA Detention Memo, supra note 41.
44. Jon Woodward, “Gov’t to Tamils: pay smugglers or stay in jail,” CTV News (30 March 2011, 
last updated 27 November 2015), online: <bc.ctvnews.ca/gov-t-to-tamils-pay-smugglers-or-stay-in-
jail-1.625138> [perma.cc/CXP6-SJ68].
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in the paper; the CBSA was so focused on the singular route of seeking 
continued detention that it became blind to the absurd consequences of its 
demands and actions. 
In some cases, where claimants were ordered released by the 
Immigration Division, the government ? led motions in Federal Court, 
requesting a stay of the claimant’s release. In my experience, while 
it happens on occasion, it is certainly not a common practice for the 
government to seek stays of release orders. The CBSA detention strategy 
memo contemplates seeking stays as a litigation strategy, advising that 
where a release was ordered by the Immigration Division, CBSA was to 
“immediately consult with Litigation Management and Department of 
Justice to determine whether there are any grounds to seek a stay of release 
while an application for leave and judicial review is considered.”45 In 
some instances, there were multiple successive motions ? led seeking stay 
orders of multiple successive release orders of the Immigration Division in 
respect of the same detainee. As set out in the section on legal challenges to 
CBSA conduct, the Federal Court did have this systemic practice brought 
to its attention, and ultimately found this type of tactic to be abusive.46 
A number of the refugee hearings of the Sun Sea claimants were 
delayed while CBSA pursued allegations that the claimants were 
inadmissible to Canada. As noted above, such allegations suspend 
the refugee claim determination process, pending the decision by the 
Immigration Division on the question of inadmissibility.47 Two principal 
grounds of inadmissibility were argued by the CBSA against Sun Sea 
claimants. These were involvement in people smuggling by assisting with 
work on the Sun Sea and/or alleged membership in the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).48 
Regarding the people smuggling allegations, the CBSA argued that 
an individual need not be motivated by pro? t, nor did they require any 
connection to a criminal organization in order to be found criminally 
inadmissible for people smuggling. These arguments were successful 
45. CBSA Detention Memo, supra note 41.
46. See the text accompanying note 64 for discussion on Canada v Canada (MCI) v B386, 2011 FC 
175 [B386].
47. IRPA, supra note 19 s 103(1)(a).  
48. The CBSA had referred 64 Sun Sea cases to an admissibility hearing. As of January 2017, 16 
of those referrals were withdrawn; the Minister was not able to establish inadmissibility in 24 of the 
cases (15 of these cases were appealed by the Minister and in 8 of the appeals, the Minister lost and 
in 4, the Minister was successful in establishing the inadmissibility). As of January 2017, 18 of the 
Sun Sea claimants were issued a deportation order. This number would include those claimants who 
were found inadmissible based on the “people smuggling” de? nition that was later overturned by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in B010 v Canada (MCI), 2015 SCC 58 [B010]; See IRB, Report: Marine 
Arrivals at the IRB As of January 1st, 2017, emailed to author 1 March 2019.
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before a number of the adjudicators at the Immigration Division, judges at 
the Federal Court, and the Federal Court of Appeal.49 Thus claimants, who 
had not only received no pro? t, but in fact had ?????money themselves to 
take the voyage to seek asylum, were being found inadmissible for people 
smuggling. It was considered legally irrelevant that those on the ship 
who offered their assistance during the voyage were also ? eeing to seek 
asylum like the other passengers and were motivated by self-preservation 
and the protection of their families and others on board the dilapidated 
vessel. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada held that this was the 
wrong interpretation of the statute. The Supreme Court found that people 
smuggling had to, at the very least, include a ? nancial pro? t motive and 
a connection to a criminal organization, and that those who engaged in 
mutual assistance in a “collective ? ight for safety” could not be found to 
be inadmissible on this ground.50
The CBSA intervened in every, or virtually every, refugee hearing 
of a ??????? claimant. Ordinarily, CBSA intervenes in cases involving 
criminality, possible exclusion from the refugee de? nition, program 
integrity or credibility of an individual claimant.51 In the ??????? cases, 
it was decided in advance of the boat arriving, and without any evidence 
of a security threat, criminality, or doubt as to a particular claimant’s 
credibility, that the Minister would intervene and oppose the claims. This 
was decided before the hearing of? cers had read the basis of the claimants’ 
refugee claims and made an initial assessment of whether there were any 
issues to support the need for an intervention.52 In general, the sense among 
practitioners was that no matter the case, CBSA intervened, and, no matter 
the case, they opposed. CBSA even intervened and opposed the claims of 
unaccompanied minors on the boat. 
A standard argument made by the CBSA hearing of? cers was that the 
war was over in Sri Lanka and therefore there no longer was a risk to 
the claimants. Generally, the same standard disclosure package was used 
in the refugee claims by CBSA. CBSA hearing of? cers also appeared 
at the refugee hearings and questioned claimants and argued that their 
allegations were not credible. Later, it became apparent that the hearing 
of? cers intervening in the cases had not disclosed critical information in 
their possession about how ??????? deportees had been treated upon return 
49. See, e.g., ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????, 2013 FCA 262.
50. ????????????note 49 at paras 63, 72, 76.
51. ??????????????note 29 at 12-13.
52. The government’s current policy is that intervention decisions will be taken based on review of 
the Basis of Claim form, interview notes, and other documents submitted, and the policy at the time 
was similar. See ??????????????note 29 at 7.
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to Sri Lanka. The Federal Court held that hearing of? cers were Crown 
representatives and had a duty of candour to provide all the relevant 
disclosure if they had already disclosed some material in the proceeding.53
There was an unusually high number of judicial reviews ? led by 
the government against positive determinations made by the Refugee 
Protection Division on their refugee claims. In my experience, it is rare 
for the Department of Justice to ? le an application for leave and judicial 
review against a positive refugee determination; in the overwhelming 
majority of cases challenging Refugee Protection Division decisions that 
are brought to Federal Court, the Minister is the Respondent and not the 
Applicant.
IV. Rule of law implications of CBSA conduct in relation to Sun Sea 
claims
The approach to these cases was unusual in that there was a pre-determined 
uniform approach that required an incredible amount of state resources. 
There can be no doubt that these individual claimants faced greater than 
normal scrutiny of their claims. The level of attention paid to these claims 
was not based on any inherent characteristics relating to the merits of 
the claimants’ refugee claims—the only difference between them and 
the many other Tamil refugee claimants accepted by Canada was their 
method of travel. Even other Tamil claimants who had travelled via ship 
to Canada, the Ocean Lady claimants, arguably fared better than these 
claimants. For example, while the Ocean Lady adult claimants were also 
all detained upon arrival, they were generally released after approximately 
three months of detention.54 
A core concept of the rule of law is the need to “prevent and constrain 
arbitrariness within the exercise of public authority by political and legal 
of? cials in terms of process, jurisdiction and substance.”55 In the context 
of international refugee law, “’[a]rbitrariness’ includes elements of 
53. See text accompanying note 63 for discussion on B135 v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 871 [B135].
54. Gordon Maynard, “Arrest and Detention” (Paper delivered at CBA National Immigration and 
Citizenship Continuing Legal Education Conference, Montreal, 9-11 May 2013), online (pdf): <www.
cba.org/CBA/cle/PDF/IMM13_paper_maynard.pdf> [perma.cc/C4TQ-DGQH].
55. Mary Liston, “Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State” in Lorne 
Sossin & Colleen Flood, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2013) 39 at 41. 
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inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability, or without due process 
of law.”56
As documented above, CBSA decided in advance of the Sun Sea’s 
arrival that it would take an aggressive approach in order to deter future 
refugee claimants from coming by boat. This approach was untethered to 
the merits of any individual’s refugee claim.57
While the determination of the Sun Sea passengers’ refugee claims 
took place within a tribunal system that arguably afforded a fair hearing 
process, that alone is not suf? cient to ensure that the rule of law was 
observed. As in other areas of law in which individuals are in an adversarial 
position relative to the state, the conduct of the state is also relevant for 
assessing whether the process tends towards or away from the rule of law. 
Both the general instructions under which CBSA of? cers are required 
to operate and the individual actions and decisions of CBSA of? cers are 
relevant. The direction given by CBSA management to its of? cers was to 
act in a way which would deter future claimants from arriving by boat. To 
this end, the instructions were to work aggressively to establish that the 
claimants were inadmissible to Canada, and they were not refugees. The 
overarching stance of the agency, under which individual of? cers had to 
operate, was that the claims should be resisted. This optic was established 
before any of the claims has been presented, much less assessed on their 
merits. From the perspective of Sun Sea claimants, the aggressiveness of 
the government’s resistance to their claims and its arguments in favour 
of their detention were arbitrary and unjust because the approach—not 
a general approach to all refugees but an approach speci? c to them—
was taken without regard to the merits of their refugee claims, was not 
predictable based on the government’s usual approach to handling refugee 
claims, and was arbitrary. 
While the claims themselves would be determined by the IRB, the 
over-arching approach to the claims by CBSA was reminiscent of “tunnel 
vision.” The phenomenon of tunnel vision has been de? ned, by the 
Morin Inquiry on Wrongful Convictions, as a “single-minded and overly 
narrow focus on a particular investigative or prosecutorial theory, so as 
to unreasonably colour the evaluation of information received and one’s 
56. We Have No Rights: Arbitrary Imprisonment and Cruel Treatment of Migrants with Mental 
Health Issues in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Faculty of Law—International Human 
Rights Program, 2015) at 88, (citing A v Australia, UNHRC Communication No 560/1993, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997) at para 9.2; Gorji-Dinka v Cameroon, UNHRC Communication No 
1134/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002 (2005) at para 5.1).
57. CBSA Arrivals memo, supra note 3.
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conduct in response to that information.”58 In the criminal justice context, 
“tunnel vision” on the part of police and/or prosecutors has contributed 
to miscarriages of justice, even when the ? nal decision remains with the 
courts.59 As explained above, the phenomenon of CBSA hearing of? cers 
demanding proof that the family members of the Sun Sea claimants had 
paid their outstanding debts to the smugglers, is a kind of “tunnel vision” 
on the part of a government authority. Arguably, deciding to intervene in 
every case to oppose the claim before knowing anything about the facts 
of the particular claim for protection could be characterized as “tunnel 
vision.”
V. Legal challenges to CBSA conduct in Sun Sea claims
There were several legal challenges concerning the substantive arguments 
raised in these cases relating to admissibility, refugee determination and 
detention. As noted above, the de? nition of people smuggling, in the 
context of refugees collectively ? eeing for safety and providing one another 
with mutual aid, went to the Supreme Court of Canada.60 There were also 
a number of cases where the government challenged Refugee Protection 
Division decisions to grant asylum, where the decision identi? ed having 
been a passenger on the Sun Sea as placing the claimant at risk of being 
persecuted by Sri Lanka if returned.61 
In conversations with fellow refugee lawyers working on the Sun Sea 
cases at the time, there was a general sense that there was no venue in which 
to effectively challenge the structural systemic unfairness we were seeing 
in how these claimants were treated by CBSA. We observed that there was 
a general pattern in which these cases were approached differently than 
others. We could see the aggressive and intensive amount of state resources 
used to ? ght these cases, on the whole, but in any given individual case it 
was hard to ? nd ways to effectively challenge this conduct. There were a 
few cases where the Federal Court speci? cally addressed the conduct of 
CBSA in handling Sun Sea cases: B135, B386 and B006.
B135 was a challenge to the failure of the CBSA hearing of? cer to 
disclose all of relevant evidence in their possession when intervening in 
a refugee claim. Justice Harrington held that by providing incomplete 
58. Public Prosecution Service of Canada, “2.4 Prevention of Wrongful Convictions” in Public 
Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (1 March 2014), online (pdf): < https://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/
eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/d-g-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/2AWM-THM2] at 68 citing recommendation 
74 in Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Commission on Proceedings Involving 
Guy Paul Morin, (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1998) at 1136 [PPSC Deskbook].
59. Ibid.
60. B010, supra note 49.
61. See, e.g., YS v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 324 [YS] and Canada (MCI) v A032, 2013 FC 322. 
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evidence, Minister’s Counsel had misled the Refugee Protection Division. 
The Minister only provided some of the information in their possession 
relating to the return of ??????? claimants who had been deported back to 
Sri Lanka. They failed to provide an af? davit from one of the deportees 
asserting that he was beaten and tortured upon return.62 
???? was a challenge to the pattern of the government seeking a chain 
of stays in response to release orders being issued by the Immigration 
Division. In this case, a release order was granted (release decision #1), 
and the Minister then sought a stay of the release order while it pursued a 
judicial review of the release. While awaiting the judicial review of release 
decision #1, the individual had two more detention review hearings 
(release decisions #2 and #3). In each instance, the Immigration Division 
found no grounds for continuing detention and ordered him released. 
The Minister sought then to overturn both release decisions #2 and #3 by 
applying for judicial review. The Minister obtained stays of the person’s 
release pending the judicial review hearings. The Minister lost the judicial 
review of release #1. The Minister then argued that the individual should 
nevertheless ????be released because the stays of release decisions #2 and 
#3 meant he had to remain detained. Such a cycle could have carried on, 
trapping the individual in detention despite repeated decisions to release 
him, and despite court orders upholding the decisions to release. The 
Federal Court, however, put a stop to the cycle. The court ruled that to 
allow this to continue would be an abuse of process.63 
???? was, in part, a challenge to the conduct of the CBSA enforcement 
of? cer and CBSA hearing of? cer in the context of an admissibility 
hearing.64 It was argued that when the conduct of the two of? cers was 
taken together, it amounted to an abuse of process that required a stay of 
proceedings. The enforcement of? cer’s interrogations included trickery, 
false inducements, and threatening to interview the claimant’s seven year 
old son about his activities. The Member of the Immigration Division held 
that the tone and method of the interrogations were “unlike anything…[she] 
had previously observed from a CBSA of? cer,” ? nding he “overstated the 
strength of the information” that he had about the claimant and “proceeded 
in a far more aggressive manner than the Member had so far observed 
being taken in interviews with refugee claimants.” The hearing of? cer, 
who represented the government at the admissibility hearing, also failed to 
62. ????????????note 54.
63. ????????????note 47.
64. I acted as co-counsel for B006 at his inadmissibility where the abuse of process argument was 
raised. 
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disclose interviews, provided incomplete transcripts of some interviews, 
and misstated the evidence. The Member held “the Minister’s comments 
about the nature of their evidence against B006 were ‘not credible’ and 
‘highly irresponsible.’” Despite these ? ndings, the Member declined to ? nd 
there was an abuse of process, holding that the client was not prejudiced 
because he did not give in to the of? cer’s tricks and that she had already 
dealt with the hearing of? cer’s misconduct through her various orders to 
allow for disclosure and to exclude certain evidence. 
On judicial review, the Federal Court agreed, ? nding that the conduct 
had not shaken the public’s con? dence in the integrity of the justice 
system. The Court placed weight on the context of the claimant having 
arrived on the Sun Sea and the “large and complex” investigation involved 
when considering the propriety of CBSA’s conduct. While part of what 
the case sought to address was the overzealous manner in which the cases 
of these claimants were pursued on the part of the CBSA, the overall 
cumulative impact of the aggressive conduct of CBSA was unfortunately 
not addressed.65 
Even where the Court addressed CBSA misconduct, each judge was 
limited to considering the speci? c conduct that was placed before the court 
in that case. The court had no basis on which to examine or regulate the 
broad and deliberate pattern of conduct across the sweep of the Sun Sea 
cases. The courts’ supervision of CBSA conduct, while an important tool, 
is arguably not the ideal tool, and certainly not the most accessible tool, 
to deal with systemic problems connected with CBSA conduct. Change 
is needed to bring independent supervision for CBSA, and to restructure 
and create a healthy separation in the relationship between CBSA law 
enforcement of? cers and the CBSA hearings of? cers who represent the 
government before the Immigration and Refugee Board. 
VI. Building accountability at the CBSA
The Sun Sea cases highlight systemic structural design problems within (and 
surrounding) CBSA. There was no straightforward way to complain about 
CBSA enforcement of? cers who crossed the line in their interrogations of 
a claimant. The Immigration Division member who heard B006’s case held 
she did not have the jurisdiction to police the conduct of the enforcement 
of? cer. While there was limited relief from the Federal Court in addressing 
particular hearing of? cers’ misstatement of facts and failures to fully 
disclose the record, judicial admonishment and speci? c remedies given in 
individual cases did not address the larger issues identi? ed in this paper. 
65. B006 v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 1033.
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Even if one were successful in challenging the conduct of a particular 
enforcement of? cer or hearing of? cer at the Board or the Federal Court, 
it was not possible to get at the pattern of conduct—the pre-determined 
uniform and aggressive approach that was speci? cally planned to ? ght the 
legal claims of these 492 individuals. Moreover, such litigation strategies 
are dif? cult to mount, particularly with limited resources and when the 
primary focus is arguing for the client’s underlying claim for refugee 
protection and status in Canada.
The handling of the Sun Sea claims point to at least two potentially 
bene? cial fundamental reforms at CBSA that could enhance fairness. 
First, the federal government should follow through with its commitment 
to build an independent review mechanism to respond to complaints about 
CBSA conduct. Second, there needs to be a structural separation between 
the of? cers doing enforcement/investigation work and those representing 
the Crown before the tribunal, and an organizational culture needs to be 
developed that values the rationale for the separation of these roles.
1. Meaningful independent review mechanism of CBSA law 
enforcement conduct 
It has become a fairly common refrain in border policy discussions and 
the media in recent years that there must be an independent accountability 
mechanism for the law enforcement conduct of CBSA.66 While CBSA 
of? cers possess greater powers than other police, they are unlike every 
other signi? cant law enforcement agency in Canada in that they lack 
any independent complaint and review mechanism. In March 2016, the 
federal government ? rst committed to establishing such a body, but three 
years later, as of the time of writing, it is clear that the government has 
insuf? cient time to follow through with legislation during the current 
66. See, e.g., “Model for CBSA Accountability Mechanism Recommended” (17 March 2016), 
online: Canadian Council for Refugees <ccrweb.ca/en/release-model-cbsa-accountability-
mechanism> [perma.cc/Z9NF-TZEP]; Kim Pemberton, “Death in CBSA custody sparks calls for 
accountability,” Vancouver Sun (1 January 2014), online: <www.vancouversun.com/life/death+cbs
a+custody+sparks+calls+accountability/9451549/story.html > [perma.cc/AWU7-WLV2]; Meghan 
Potkins, “Calls for more oversight of border agents following death at Calgary airport,” Calgary 
Herald (10 August 2018), online: <calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/calls-for-more-oversight-of-
cbsa-following-death-at-calgary-airport> [perma.cc/MBM4-A4CR]; Senate of Canada, Report of the 
Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Vigilance, Accountability and Security at 
Canada’s Borders (June 2015) (Chair: The Honourable Daniel Lang), online (pdf): <sencanada.ca/
content/sen/Committee/412/secd/rep/rep16jun15a-e.pdf> [perma.cc/R8Y3-FFEY].
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Parliament (though the government reiterated publicly as recently as 
February 2019 that it intended to establish an oversight mechanism).67 
Much has been written about the need for an independent accountability 
mechanism and the possible design of such a body, so I will not belabour 
those points here.68 I will simply underline a few ways in which the need 
for an independent review body is especially acute in relation to refugee 
claims, and the Sun Sea cases make this starkly evident. 
One procedural feature of Canadian refugee law particularly 
underscores the need for an independent accountability mechanism. 
Refugee claimants are required by section 16 of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act to answer CBSA’s questions truthfully. Instead of 
having a right to remain silent in the face of an adversarial interrogation, 
the claimant has an obligation to answer. As claimants are making a 
request of Canada, an obligation to answer questions is not problematic 
in itself, but it does make claimants uniquely vulnerable in relation to 
their interrogators. While a claimant is detained, as the Sun Sea claimants 
were, a failure to cooperate and to answer questions could be invoked 
to justify more lengthy detention, or be used as the basis of an adverse 
inference against the claimant in their hearing. As the claimants have no 
choice but to answer, it is especially important that the conduct of the 
of? cers carrying out the questioning be fair and act in line with appropriate 
standards – but there is no independent review body to review and verify 
this. By contrast, in other kinds of police questioning in which suspects 
have the right to remain silent and witnesses have no obligation to speak 
and are free to walk away, each of them could complain to an independent 
body if they felt they were treated unfairly in those interactions. There is 
simply no principled or practical justi? cation for CBSA’s status as the only 
law enforcement agency in Canada that lacks an external accountability 
mechanism. 
As noted above, it is often dif? cult to raise systemic issues in 
individual cases—particularly since refugee claimants are understandably 
67. Michelle Zilio, “Ottawa mulls greater scrutiny of border agency after detainee deaths,” The 
Globe and Mail (March 15, 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/liberals-mull-
improved-scrutiny-of-border-agency-amid-criticism-over-deaths/article29252389/> [perma.cc/
WSF2-GEP5]; Canada Border Services Agency, “Minister Goodale announces roll-out of expanded 
Alternatives to Detention Program through the National Immigration Detention Framework” (24 July 
2018), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/border-services-agency/news/2018/07/
minister-goodale-announces-roll-out-of-expanded-alternatives-to-detention-program-through-the-
national-immigration-detention-framework.html> [perma.cc/KKC6-JN6M]; “National security 
committee to probe Border Services activities,” CBC News (5 February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/
news/politics/nsicop-reviews-cbsa-1.5006772> [perma.cc/KQ5G-UJMU]. 
68. BCCLA, supra note 16. 
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focused on securing their status in Canada, and it may not be in their 
direct best interest to pursue a broader complaint about their treatment by 
CBSA. For this reason, and because many of the people with whom CBSA 
deals are vulnerable persons and may be outside of Canada, the ability to 
receive complaints from third parties is a critical feature of any potential 
independent review mechanism.69 
In the Sun Sea cases, while the ability to make individual complaints 
would have certainly made a difference, it would have been especially 
useful for third parties to be able to make such complaints. Unlike 
individual claimants, organizations working with refugees or human rights 
organizations could have ? led comprehensive complaints about CBSA’s 
approach to the Sun Sea cases, based on information shared with them 
from multiple individuals’ cases, in order to help shed light on whether 
CBSA of? cers, and CBSA as an organization, conducted itself fairly and 
appropriately. Had such a review determined that there were shortcomings 
in CBSA’s conduct—as I argue there were—that may have produced 
useful recommendations to guide future conduct, and training, and would 
have informed the public and Parliament about CBSA’s activities. If 
such a mechanism had been available and used early on as the Sun Sea 
cases began to be determined, the external scrutiny itself, along with any 
? ndings or decisions from such a body, might have had a positive effect on 
CBSA conduct throughout the years of dealing with the Sun Sea claimants 
in ensuring that claimants were both treated fairly and experienced the 
process as a fair one.
2. Separation between the roles of enforcement of? cers and hearings 
of? cers
As noted above, hearing of? cers act as Crown representatives. They 
represent the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and/
or the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship at hearings 
at the Immigration and Refugee Board, including at detention reviews, 
admissibility hearings, appeals of admissibility determinations, and 
refugee hearings.70 The Federal Court has held that hearing of? cers, as 
Crown representatives, like Crown counsel, owe the tribunal a duty of 
candour.71 
69. “Proposed CCR Model for a CBSA Accountability Mechanism” (March 2016), online (pdf): 
Canadian Council for Refugees <ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/? les/ccr-cbsa-accountability-model.pdf> 
[perma.cc/7DST-QEC8] at 2 ; BCCLA, supra note 16 at 46-47.
70. The Honourable Ralph Goodale, “CBSA 2017-2018 Departmental Plan,” online (pdf): Canada 
Border Services Agency <www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/reports-rapports/rpp/2017-2018/
report-rapport-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/U97Q-7MRY] at 23.
71. Shen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 70.
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Section 6(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act allows 
the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to delegate his 
authorities set out in the Act and Regulations to CBSA of? cers. While, in 
general, the principal function that hearing of? cers perform is to represent 
the government at the tribunal, they are, in fact, authorized to do much 
more. Many of the powers conferred on them by the delegated authority 
can also and are typically used by enforcement of? cers. These include the 
power to arrest and detain certain foreign nationals without a warrant, the 
power to conduct an examination of a person seeking entry into Canada, 
the authority to determine what evidence and documents are necessary to 
complete the examination of the foreign national, including photographic 
and ? ngerprint evidence, and the power to search any person seeking to 
enter Canada.72 
While hearing of? cers do not typically perform these purely 
investigative and enforcement roles, the fact that they have been assigned 
the legal authority to do so demonstrates that a separation between the 
investigative and hearing of? cer roles was not built into the design of the 
system. The lack of formal separation suggests a lack of attention to the 
danger of mixing investigative/enforcement roles with the responsibilities 
of representing the Crown when appearing at the tribunal.
The CBSA memo that was written in anticipation of the Sun Sea’s arrival 
provides a snapshot of an agency in which investigation/enforcement work 
and the arguments to be presented at the tribunal in individual claims were 
thought of as one uniform strategy. The strategy mapped out an aggressive 
approach in which detention would be sought as long as possible, and 
where hearing of? cers would apply to intervene, appear and oppose each 
refugee hearing.73 It raises a question as to whether, in this context, hearing 
of? cers would have been more susceptible to pre-judge the individual 
cases of Sun Sea claimants. We expect criminal Crown counsel to exercise 
a duty of impartiality and objectivity. We expect this as a matter of fairness, 
but also in order to avoid undue political control over prosecutions and to 
avoid law enforcement acting as the driving force in prosecutions. 
The CBSA structure is not built to ensure hearings of? cers are 
independent from the law enforcement side. Hearings of? cers and inland 
enforcement of? cers work in the same agency; despite having different 
72. The Honourable Ralph Goodale, “Delegation of Authority and Designations of Of? cers by the 
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness under the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations,” online: Canada Border Services 
Agency <www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/actreg-loireg/delegation/irpa-lipr-2016-07-eng.html> 
[perma.cc/9TQN-KUD8].
73. CBSA Arrivals memo, supra note 3.
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direct managers, they often work together in the same physical space. 
Moreover, as set out above, hearing of? cers are legally delegated the 
power to conduct investigative and law enforcement functions. 
In the criminal context, it is beyond debate that this con? ation of roles 
would be unacceptable. Criminal prosecution and law enforcement, while 
they work in collaboration and consultation with each other, are meant to 
operate entirely independent of each other. The need for this independence 
and separation has been referred to repeatedly by the courts and inquiries 
in relation to wrongful convictions.74 The Ontario Crown Policy Manual 
states: “Although Crown counsel work closely with the police, the 
separation between police and Crown roles is of fundamental importance 
to the proper administration of justice.”75 The police and prosecutorial 
functions are housed in separate ministries (if not separate levels of 
government all together). They have completely different mandates. 
In addition to their formal separation from law enforcement, Crown 
prosecutors also have an important measure of independence from political 
direction. While the Attorney General sets broad policy and direction, 
Crown counsel are generally given signi? cant latitude to make decisions 
in individual cases based on the merits of the case.76 Their duty is to 
represent the public interest in seeking the prosecution of the guilty and 
the protection of the innocent77—evaluating and seeking a just outcome in 
each individual case, and not simply seeking convictions. As the Supreme 
Court of Canada stated in Boucher, “[i]t cannot be overemphasized that 
the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction. […] 
The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing.”78
While the role of the hearing of? cer in a refugee or immigration 
proceeding may not be perfectly analogous to that of a Crown prosecutor in 
a criminal proceeding, hearing of? cers—like Crown attorneys—deal with 
74. Jeremy Tatum, “Re-Evaluating Independence: The Emerging Problem of Crown-Police 
Alignment” (2012) 30:2 Windsor YB Access Just 225 at 226; PPSC Deskbook, supra note 59 s 2.1 
“Independence and Accountability in Decision Making”; Newfoundland and Labrador, Attorney 
General, “Crown Attorney’s Independence and Accountability in Decision Making” (1 October 
2007) at 2-4, online (pdf): Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Justice and Public Safety 
<www.justice.gov.nl.ca/just/prosect/guidebook/002.pdf> [perma.cc/6JGP-DECY]; Ontario, Attorney 
General, “Crown Prosecution Manual: D.31 Professionalism,” online: Government of Ontario <www.
ontario.ca/document/crown-prosecution-manual/d-31-professionalism> [perma.cc/YXS9-3U8Q]. 
75. Ontario, Attorney General, “Role of the Crown—Preamble to the Crown Policy Manual” (21 
March 2005) at 3, online (pdf): Attorney General of Ontario <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/
english/crim/cpm/2005/CPMPreamble.pdf> [perma.cc/49ET-UEDA] (citing R v Regan, 2002 SCC 
12).
76. Ibid at 2. 
77. Ibid; See also R v Boucher, [1955] SCR 16 at paras 23-24, [1954] SCJ 54 [Boucher].
78. Boucher, ibid at para 26.
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cases in which there are signi? cant rights and interests at stake, including 
life or death questions, questions of liberty and family separation. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that in certain cases, the stakes 
for the individual refugee claimant can be even more serious than that of 
an accused person in a criminal trial.79 While the Minister of Public Safety, 
for whom the hearing of? cers work, does not have the same non-partisan 
and independent role in relation to the justice system as does the Attorney 
General, the government nevertheless has a duty under the IRPA to uphold 
the Refugee Convention, to fairly assess claims and to protect refugees, 
while also protecting the integrity of the refugee protection system and 
public safety. This is not unlike the balanced role of the Crown attorney 
in seeking to prosecute the guilty while protecting a fair process and 
protecting innocent, in the public interest.80 
The question of structural separation between CBSA of? cers 
representing Canada in hearings on the one hand, and CBSA law 
enforcement activities on the other has, to my knowledge, not been the 
79. Canadian law has also evolved to recognize the severity of the potential immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently considered three 
cases dealing with the impact of immigration consequences that ? ow from criminal convictions on 
non-citizens. In R v Pham, 2013 SCC 15, the Court considered these consequences to be so signi? cant 
that it decided that appellate courts may set aside or vary criminal sentences in instances in which the 
collateral immigration consequences were not considered by the sentencing court. In Tran v Canada 
(PSEP), 2017 SCC 50, there was recognition that an individual can experience the immigration 
consequences of a crime more severely than the criminal consequences. The Court accepted evidence 
that the individual concerned had sought a prison sentence, a harsher criminal penalty, rather than a 
longer conditional sentence, in order to avoid deportation. In Wong v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 
SCC 25, the Court held that a guilty plea was uninformed if an accused was not aware of the collateral 
immigration consequences of a conviction. Taken together, these cases demonstrate an elevated 
concern in the law for the uniquely serious nature of immigration consequences for an individual.
80. A change of this nature suggests the need to change the training and perhaps the required 
quali? cations for CBSA hearings of? cers. In fact, that need is already suggested in the CBSA’s 
own evaluation of its hearings program. CBSA’s evaluation report states that hearings of? cers “are 
highly specialized and require strong technical and legal knowledge with which to prepare cases and 
arguments for presentation in front of the IRB,” but notes that the “feeder groups” of candidates 
coming to the positions “represent a wide range of backgrounds and levels of experience within the 
immigration and legal streams.” The evaluation concluded, in relation to training: “Key Finding: 
National Training Standards for HOs [hearings of? cers] exist. However, the delivery and timing of the 
training provided by the CBSA to Hearings Program staff does not align with the need for specialized 
training (such as, the preparation of legal arguments) and the unique requirements of the various 
feeder groups.” The report also identi? ed a need to re-evaluate recruitment strategies for the hearings 
of? cer positions “to account for the specialized and technical job functions of Hearings Of? cers.” 
See: CBSA Internal Audit and Program Evaluation Directorate, “Evaluation of the CBSA Hearings 
Program” (December 2018), online: Canada Border Services Agency <www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-
agence/reports-rapports/ae-ve/2018/imp-pa-eng.html> [perma.cc/5VEV-CQJV]. CBSA recognizes 
that its current program does not adequately train hearings of? cers to make legal arguments, despite 
that function being at the core of their work. Under any structural model, whether hearings of? cers 
are made more independent or not, this clearly needs to be remedied in order to ensure that the system 
works properly and fairly.
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subject of any serious consideration by the government of Canada in 
recent years. The Sun Sea cases demonstrate how the lack of separation 
can have an impact on the rights and interests of refugee claimants. This 
same lack of independence from CBSA’s law enforcement functions is 
likely to affect the conduct of thousands of other cases. 
My observations and recommendations are consistent with those from 
a July 2018 IRB ordered External Audit of 300 longer-term detention 
cases. 81 While CBSA was not the focus of the audit’s ? ndings (as it was 
directed at evaluating the work of the Immigration Division), the auditor 
made a number of a ? ndings relating to the conduct of CBSA hearing 
of? cers appearing before the Immigration Division in detention cases. 
These include hearing of? cers sometimes overstated the evidence or 
drew conclusions based on speculation rather than proven fact, there 
was evidence that hearing of? cers provided inaccurate information to 
the tribunal, hearing of? cers failed to disclose relevant materials to the 
tribunal and the detained party, and in some instances, hearing of? cers 
appeared to intimidate tribunal members. The auditor compared the role 
of hearing of? cers to that of Crown counsel, and noted their failure to take 
an “of? cer of the court” approach: 
While outside the scope of this audit, it is clear that a more nationally 
consistent approach on the part of CBSA that re? ected its role as 
an “of? cer of the court” could greatly assist the ID in meeting the 
expectations of the courts and Charter standards. This can be done 
without compromising CBSA’s legitimate interests as a party before the 
ID in the same manner that Crown Attorneys function in the criminal 
courts across this country every day.82
In my view, therein lies the fundamental problem in how CBSA hearing 
of? cers perform their role—hearing of? cers do not consistently view the 
role they are playing before the tribunal as one that is more akin to criminal 
Crown counsel than to that of their colleagues who conduct investigations 
and enforcement actions. Structurally separating the hearing of? cer and 
law enforcement functions of the CBSA would improve the integrity of 
the refugee, detention and admissibility determination systems. It may be 
81. “Report of the 2017/2018 External Audit (Detention Review)” (20 July 2018), online: Immigration 
and Refugee Board of Canada <irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/transparency/reviews-audit-evaluations/Pages/ID-
external-audit-1718.aspx> [perma.cc/GGA3-7DT] [Detention Audit]; See also? Brendan Kennedy, 
“‘What if we rattle his f—n’ cages?’ Government of? cials overheard discussing how to cross-examine 
mentally ill detainee,” The Toronto Star (28 June 2018), online: <www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/06/28/
star-reporter-overhears-government-of? cials-discuss-how-to-cross-examine-mentally-ill-immigration-
detainee.html> [perma.cc/59G2-DKG6].
82. Detention Audit, ibid “Role and Mandate of CBSA.” 
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that this separation would involve locating their roles in different agencies 
and under different ministers; or it could be that hearing of? cers are 
not delegated with the power to perform investigative and enforcement 
functions and the two types of of? cers do not share the same physical 
space. While hearing of? cers and law enforcement will often, and quite 
properly, communicate and collaborate with each other, they should be 
separate in fact, and in appearance. At the very least, dialogue must begin 
about the proper role of hearing of? cers before the Immigration and 
Refugee Board with a plan to address the ? ndings about their misconduct 
before the tribunal.
??????????
It has been almost nine years since the ?????????? landed on the coast of 
British Columbia. Four hundred and ninety-two refugee claimants were 
subjected to an intense amount of scrutiny and an overwhelming amount of 
state resources mounted to oppose their claims and to seek their continued 
detention. Despite the aggressive ? ght against their claims for protection, 
many of these claimants have been recognized as refugees and live in 
Canada.83 Some of those found to qualify as protected persons continue 
to wait to be reunited with their immediate family members, whom they 
left behind. Some still await a hearing on their claim or a determination 
of their risk of return.84 Others were found inadmissible based on an 
interpretation of ”people smuggling” that has now been overturned by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
The handling of the ???? ???? claims should serve as a lesson to 
government. I have argued in this paper that the pre-determined, aggressive 
approach used by CBSA to ? ght their legal claims threatened basic 
principles of the rule of law. The CBSA’s approach to the legal claims of 
the ????????passengers?highlights the systemic need for reform in CBSA 
design to ensure meaningful access to accountability reviews and checks 
on undue political in? uence in the adjudicative process. 
83. As of February 2019, of 492 ????????refugee claims ? led, 335 were accepted, 107 were refused, 
and 37 were abandoned or withdrawn. Source: Email to author from IRB, 1 March 2019.
84. Thirteen claims remain to be determined. Source: Email to author from IRB, 1 March 2019.
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